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ABSTRACT
We propose a general framework for strategic voting when a
voter may lack knowledge about other votes or about other
voters’ knowledge about her own vote. In this setting we de-
fine notions of manipulation and equilibrium. We also model
action changing knowledge about votes, such as a voter re-
vealing its preference or as a central authority performing a
voting poll. Some forms of manipulation are preserved un-
der such updates and others not. Another form of knowledge
dynamics is the effect of a voter declaring its vote. We envis-
age Stackelberg games for uncertain profiles. The purpose
of this investigation is to provide the epistemic background
for the analysis and design of voting rules that incorporate
uncertainty.
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1. INTRODUCTION
A well-known fact in social choice theory is that strategic
voting, also known as manipulation, becomes harder when
voters know less about the preferences of other voters. Stan-
dard approaches to manipulation in social choice theory [13,
24] as well as in computational social choice [5] assume that
the manipulating voter knows perfectly how the other vot-
ers will vote. Some approaches [11, 4] assume that voters
have a probabilistic prior belief on the outcome of the vote,
which encompasses the case where each voter has a proba-
bility distribution over the set of profiles. A recent paper [9]
extends coalitional manipulation to incomplete knowledge,
by distinguishing manipulating from non-manipulating vot-
ers and by considering that the manipulating coalition has,
for each voter outside the coalition, a set of possible votes
encoded in the form of a partial order over candidates. Still,
we think that the study of strategic voting under complex
belief states has received little attention so far, especially
when voters are uncertain about the uncertainties of other
voters, i.e., when we model higher-order beliefs of voters.
An extreme case of uncertainty is when a voter is com-
pletely ignorant about other votes. In that case, if a ma-
nipulation under incomplete knowledge is defined in a pes-
simistic way, i.e., if it is said to be successful if it succeeds for
all possible votes of other voters, voting rules may well be
non-manipulable. For the special case where all other vot-
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ers are non-strategic this is shown for most common voting
rules in [9].
In the first place we model how uncertainty about the pref-
erences of other voters may determine a strategic vote, and
how a reduction in this uncertainty may change a strategic
vote. We restrict ourselves to the case where uncertainty is
over a number of well-described alternatives, including the
true state of affairs, between which the voter is unable to
distinguish.
We also investigate the dynamics of uncertainty. The un-
certainty reduction may be due to receiving information on
voting intentions in polls or to voters directly telling you
their preference. For simplicity we assume that received
information is correct, or rather, we only model the con-
sequences of incorporating new information after the deci-
sion to consider the information reliable. Such informative
actions can then be modelled as truthful public announce-
ments [23].
Another form of dynamics is the dynamics of declaring
votes. Declaring votes can be modeled as assignments (ontic
/ factual change). Just as there may be uncertainty about
truthful votes, there may also be uncertainty about declared
votes. Consider the following. Half of the votes are declared.
It is not known whether candidate x or y has taken the lead,
but z has clearly lost. You still have to vote. Does this in-
fluence your strategy? Another example is that of safe ma-
nipulation [25], where the manipulating voter announces her
vote to a (presumably large) set of voters sharing her pref-
erences but is unsure of how many will follow her. Finally,
consider Stackelberg voting games, wherein voters declare
their votes in sequence, following a fixed, exogeneously de-
fined order. Our framework applies to Stackelberg voting
games with uncertainty about profiles.
There are several ways of expressing incomplete knowl-
edge about the linear order of a voter. The literature on
possible and necessary winners assumes that it is expressed
by a collection of partial strict orders (one for each voter),
while Hazon et al. [15] consider it to consist of a collec-
tion of probability distributions, or a collection of sets of
linear orders (one for each voter). Whereas the latter is
more expressive (some sets of linear orders do not corre-
spond to the set of extensions of a partial order), the for-
mer is more succinct. Ours is a more expressive modelling
than both modes of representation, because an uncertain
profile can be any set of profiles. A set of profiles such as
{(a 1 b 1 c, a 2 b 2 c), (b 1 a 1 c, b 2 a 2 c)}
expresses uncertainty (ignorance) which candidate voters 1
and 2 rank first, but knowledge (certainty) that voters 1 and
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2 have identical preferences — which is not possible in [15],
and a fortiori also not in [17] and subsequent works on the
possible winner problem. Of course, this mode of represen-
tation is also the less succinct of all. However, succinctness
and complexity issues will play no role yet in this paper,
where we focus on modelling and expressivity.
Somewhat surprisingly, there are yet more complex sce-
narios that cannot be seen as uncertainty between a number
of given profiles: it may be that a voter cannot distinguish
between two situations with identical profiles, because in the
first case yet another voter has some uncertainty about the
profile, but in the other case not.
Our investigation is restricted in various ways: (i) we
model uncertainty and manipulability of individuals but not
of coalitions, (ii) we model knowledge but not belief, and,
in the dynamics, truthful announcements but not lying, (iii)
we model incomplete knowledge (uncertainty) but not other
forms of incompleteness, and (iv) as already said, we have
not investigated complexity and succinctness. The reason
for these restrictions is our desire to, first, present this com-
plete logical framework for voters uncertain about profiles.
Later we wish to broaden our scope. Let us briefly comment
on these issues here.
Epistemic and voting notions for coalitions are treated in
Section 8 in some detail.
There are many scenarios wherein voters may have incor-
rect beliefs about preferences, or where information chang-
ing actions are intended to deceive. I may incorrectly believe
that you prefer a over b, whereas you really prefer b over a. I
may tell you that I prefer a over b, but I may be lying. Such
scenarios can also be modelled in epistemic logic, with the
same tools and techniques as presented in this paper, but we
have restricted ourselves to knowledge: reliable beliefs. This
is already a far and high enough jump from the typical so-
cial choice theory perspective of reliable common knowledge
of preferences, and we think that the variety of phenomena
described within the restriction of knowledge and reliable
information already sufficiently demonstrate the expressive
power of the extension of voting with uncertainty.
The study of uncertain votes is different from the study
of other forms of incompleteness, e.g., when the number of
voters or candidates may be unknown — the only form of
incompleteness that we model is incomplete knowledge in
the form of inability to determine which of a number of
well-defined alternatives is the case. Here, we also restrict
ourselves.
Complexity issues will be occassionally referred to in run-
ning text and in the concluding Section 9.
A link between epistemic logic and voting has first been
given, as far as we know, in [8]—they use knowledge graphs
to indicate that a voter is uncertain about the preference
of another voter. A more recent approach, within the area
known as social software, is [21]. The recent [9] walks a mid-
dle way namely where equivalence classes are called infor-
mation sets, as in treatments of knowledge and uncertainty
in economics, but where the uncertain voter does not take
the uncertainty of other voters into account.
2. VOTING
This section recalls standard voting terminology.
Assume a finite set N = {1, . . . , n} of n voters (or agents),
and a finite set C = {a, b, c, . . . } of m candidates (or alterna-
tives). Voter variables are i and j, and candidate variables
are x and y (and x1, x2, ...).
Definition 1 (Vote) For each voter i a vote i ⊆ C×C is
a linear order on C.
If voter i prefers candidate a to candidate b in vote i, we
write a i b. Vote variables are i, ′i, etc. Instead of
x1 i · · · i xn we also write i : x1 . . . xn, or depict it
vertically in a table.
Definition 2 (Profile) A profile P is a collection {1, . . . ,n}
of n votes.
Let O(C) be the set of linear orders of C. Then O(C)n is the
set of all profiles for N . Profile variables are P, P ′, .... If
P ∈ O(C)n, i ∈ P , and ′i ∈ O(C), then P [i/′i] is the
profile wherein i is substituted by ′i in P .
Definition 3 (Voting rule) A voting rule is a function
F : O(C)n → C from the set of profiles to the set of can-
didates.
The voting rule determines which candidate wins the elec-
tion — F (P ) is the winner. A voting correspondence C :
O(C)n → 2C \ {∅} maps a profile to a nonempty set of tied
cowinners. To obtain a voting rule from a voting correspon-
dence (to obtain a unique winner from a non-empty set of
cowinners) we assume an exogeneously specified tie-breaking
mechanism, that is a total order  over candidates.
Voters cannot be assumed to vote according to their pref-
erences. Relative to a given profile P , a vote i ∈ P can be
called the truthful vote or preference. A voter may change
her truthful vote if this improves the outcome of the voting.
This is called a manipulation or strategic vote.
Definition 4 (Manipulation) Let i ∈ N , P ∈ O(C)n and
i ∈ P , and let ′i ∈ O(C). If F (P [i/′i]) i F (P ), then
′i is a successful manipulation by voter i.
Of course some votes that are not truthful still do not im-
prove the outcome — relative to the truthful vote i ∈ P ,
any ′i ∈ O(C) can be called a possible vote. Finally, there
is the case of the declared vote, after which a voter can no
longer change her vote. Information on declared votes may
be available to other voters (such as in Stackelberg games),
and that may change their subsequent strategic votes. This
is an overview of different votes.
• truthful vote / preference
• strategic vote / successful manipulation
• possible vote
• declared vote
We now define stable outcomes of the voting rule. The
combination of a profile P and a voting rule F defines a
strategic game: a player is a voter, an individual strategy
for a player is a vote (an individual strategy for a player in
the game theoretical sense may not be a strategic vote in the
social choice theoretical sense), a strategy profile (of players)
is therefore a profile in our defined sense (of voters), and the
preference of a player among the outcomes is according to
his preferred vote: given voter i with truthful vote i ∈ P ,
and profiles P ′, P ′′, i prefers outcome F (P ′) over outcome
F (P ′′) in the game theoretical sense iff F (P ′) i F (P ′′).
The relevant equilibrium notion is:
Definition 5 (Equilibrium profile) Given a profile P , a
profile P ′ is an equilibrium profile iff no agent has a suc-
cessful manipulation.
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In the view of a voting process as a game, an equilibrium
profile corresponds to a Nash equilibrium.
Manipulation and equilibrium for coalitions will be ad-
dressed in Section 8, later.
3. KNOWLEDGE PROFILES
We model uncertainty about voting in the sense of incom-
plete knowledge about votes. The terminology to describe
such uncertainty that we introduce in this section is fairly
standard in modal logic [12], but its application to social
choice theory is novel. The novelty consists in taking models
with profiles instead of valuations of propositional variables.
An expression like b i a is a proposition ‘voter i prefers
candidate b over candidate a’, which is true or false for any
given profile; and from that perspective, a profile is nothing
but a collection where for all voters all such variables are
given a value true or false: a valuation.
Definition 6 (Knowledge profile) Given is the set O(C)n
of all profiles for a set N = {1, . . . , n} of n voters. A pro-
file model is a structure P = (S, {∼1, . . . ,∼n}, π), where
S is a domain of abstract objects called states; where for
i = 1, . . . , n, ∼i is an indistinguishability relation that is an
equivalence relation; and where valuation π : S → O(C)n as-
signs a profile to each state. A knowledge profile is pointed
structure Ps where P is a profile model and s is a state in
the domain of P.
If s ∼i s′, π(s) = P , and π(s′) = P ′, then voter i is uncertain
if the profile is P or P ′; e.g. if j : bca in P and j : cba in
P ′, then voter i is uncertain if voter j prefers b over c or c
over b. Instead of ‘voter i is uncertain if’ we also say ‘voter
i does not know that’. We can do this formally in a logical
language interpreted on knowledge profiles.
Definition 7 (Logical language) The language L over the
set of voters N = {1, . . . , n} and the set of preferences is de-
fined as follows, where i is an agent and a, b ∈ C:
ϕ ::= a i b | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | Kiϕ
A profile P is defined in L by abbreviation as the description
of the valuation (the conjunction of all its terms a i b and
all its excluded terms ¬(a i b)). Similarly, a vote i is
defined in L by abbreviation as the i-part of that.
An element of the language is called a formula, ϕ is a formula
variable. Formula Kiϕ stands for ‘voter i knows that ϕ’. We
have allowed ourselves to overload the meaning of a i b,
as it is really the name for the atomic proposition uniquely
interpreted (below) as the truth of a i b.
Definition 8 (Semantics) The interpretation of formulas
in a knowledge profile is defined as follows:
Ps |= a i b iff a i b, where i ∈ π(s)
Ps |= ¬ϕ iff Ps 	|= ϕ
Ps |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff Ps |= ϕ and Ps |= ψ
Ps |= Kiϕ iff for every t such that s ∼i t,Pt |= ϕ
Given a knowledge profile Ps and a proposition ϕ, agent
i knows that ϕ if and only if ϕ holds for all states in P
indistinguishable for i from s (i.e., for all s′ ∈ P such that
s ∼i s′). The expression Ps 	|= ϕ stands for ‘It is not the
case that Ps |= ϕ’. If Ps |= ϕ for all s ∈ S, we write P |= ϕ
(ϕ is valid on P) and if this is the case for all P, we say
that ϕ is valid, and we write |= ϕ. Propositions like ‘voter i
knows the profile’ now have a precise description.
Example 1 Consider the following P consisting of three
states s, t, u and for two voters 1 and 2. State s is assigned
to profile P , wherein a 1 c 1 b 1 d and d 2 c 2 b 2 a,
etc. States that are indistinguishable for a voter i are linked
with an i-labelled edge. The partition for 1 on the domain is
therefore {{s, t}, {u}}, and the partition for 2 on the domain
is {{s}, {t, u}}.
1 2
a d
c c
b b
d a
——1——
1 2
a d
c c
b b
d a
——2——
1 2
d d
c c
b b
a a
s, P t, P u, P ′
States s and t have been assigned the same profile P but have
different epistemic properties. In s, 2 knows that 1 prefers
a over d, whereas in t 2 does not know that. We list some
such relevant formulas:
• Ps |= K2 a 1 d
• Pt 	|= K2 a 1 d
• P |= (1 → K1 1) ∧ (2 → K2 2)
(Both voters know there preference.)
The example demonstrates than we cannot do away with
states. Sometime, different states are being assigned the
same profile. But in many typical scenarios different states
are assigned different profiles, and then we can truly say that
the uncertainty of a voter is about a collection of profiles.
We now define the notion of ‘voter i changes her vote’ in
L.
Definition 9 (Changing a vote) We define P ↔i P ′ as
P → i ∧ P ′ → ′i ∧
∨
j =i,a,b∈C
(a j b ↔ a ′j b)
Given the abbreviations defined, P → i stands for i ∈ P .
Formula P → i says that there is a vote ′i such that
P ′ = P [i/′i].
Surprisingly, our logic of knowledge and voter preferences,
that we extend with dynamics in the next sections, is not
in fact a dynamic logic of preference [19]. Given that, the
following perspective may be of interest. In our models, the
preferences are modelled as propositional variables. These
induce preferences between states by enriching the model
with total orders expressing that: one state is more preferred
than another one, if the outcome of the truthful vote for the
profile of the first state is more preferred than the outcome
of the vote for the profile of the second state.
Definition 10 (Models for knowledge and preference)
Given a knowledge profile Ps with P = (S, {∼1, . . . ,∼n}, π)
the induced preference knowledge profile Ps is defined as
P = (S, {∼1, . . . ,∼n}, {1, . . . ,n}, π) where i is de-
fined as: for all s, t ∈ S, s i t iff F (π(s)) i F (π(t)).
Thus we reclaim the epistemic plausibility models of [3] (and
therefore, indirectly, approaches as [19]), although not in the
meaning of ‘agent i considers state s more plausible than
state t’, but in the sense of ‘voter i prefer the outcome of
voting of the profile in s to the outcome of voting of the pro-
file in t’. As there, one has a choice between global prefer-
ences or ‘local’ preferences (intersection of global preferences
with equivalence classes). This embedding seems important
enough to mention as a result:
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Proposition 1 The epistemic logic of votes can be embed-
ded into epistemic plausibility logic.
Proof. We refer to the embedding of Definition 10.
4. MANIPULATION AND KNOWLEDGE
In a knowledge profile it may be that a voter can manipu-
late the vote but does not know that, because she considers it
possible that another profile is the case in which she cannot
manipulate the vote. Such situations call for more refined
notions of manipulation that also involve knowledge. They
can be borrowed from the knowledge and action literature
[26, 16].
Given is a knowledge profile Ps where π(s) = P . If voter
i can manipulate P , then voter i also can manipulate Ps.
The uncertainty is about what the profile is. But this does
not affect that P is the actual profile.
In our modelling, if the voter can manipulate P , she al-
ways considers it possible that she can manipulate P . This
is a consequence of modelling uncertain knowledge instead of
uncertain belief. However, there are situations wherein she
considers it possible that she can manipulate, but where in
fact she cannot manipulate, namely if she considers a state
possible with a profile that is not the profile in the actual
state.
A curious situation is the one wherein in all states that the
voter considers possible there is a successful manipulation,
but where, unfortunately, this is not the same strategic vote
in all such states! So she knows that she has a successful
manipulation, but she does not know what the manipulation
is. This is called de dicto knowledge of manipulation.
A stronger form of knowing is when there is a vote that is
strategic in the profile for any state that the voter considers
possible. This is called de re knowledge of manipulation.
A further situation of interest for voting theory is when
(a) in any profile that the voter considers possible she can
vote such that the outcome is either the same or better than
when she had voted sincerely, and when (b) for at least one
possible profile the outcome is better. This can be called
weakly successful manipulation. (It is somewhat unclear if
the qualification weak should apply to the manipulation or
to the knowledge, as it is a property of a set of profiles.)
Definition 11 (Knowledge of manipulation)
Given a knowledge profile Ps.
• Voter i can successfully manipulate Ps if she can success-
fully manipulate the profile π(s).
• Voter i considers possible that she can successfully ma-
nipulate Ps if there is a t such that s ∼i t and she can
successfully manipulate π(t).
• Voter i knows ‘de dicto’ that she can successfully manip-
ulate Ps, if for all t such that s ∼i t she can successfully
manipulate π(t).
• Voter i knows ‘de re’ that she can successfully manipulate
Ps if there is a vote ′i such that for all t such that s ∼i t,
′i is a successful manipulation for profile π(t).
• Voter i knows ‘de re’ that she can weakly successfully ma-
nipulate Ps if: (a) there is a vote ′i such that for all t
such that s ∼i t, either ′i is a successful manipulation
for profile π(t) or the outcome of that vote in π(t) does
not change, and (b) there is a t such that s ∼i t and ′i
is a successful manipulation for profile π(t).
There is also a weakly successful version of ‘de dicto’ knowl-
edge of manipulation.
These notions of knowledge of manipulation do not assume
that voters know their own vote, although to apply them
under these circumstances could lead to counterintuitive re-
sults.
If voter i knows ‘de re’ that she can manipulate the elec-
tion, she has the ability to manipulate, namely by strate-
gically voting ′i. On the other hand, ‘de dicto’ manipula-
tions do not have any practical interest, since the voter does
not seem to have the ability to manipulate the election. It
is akin to ‘game of chicken’ type equilibria in game theory
[20]. Therein, for each strategy of a player there is a comple-
mentary strategy of the other player such that the pair is an
equilibrium. This cannot be guaranteed without coordina-
tion. Example 2, below, illustrates ‘de dicto’ manipulability.
Example 2 We consider manipulation with voting accord-
ing to the Borda voting rule. Consider three agents, four
candidates, and two profiles P and P ′ that are indistinguish-
able for agent 1, but that agents 2 and 3 can tell apart; as
follows.
1 2 3
c d b
b a d
a c c
d b a
——1——
1 2 3
c d b
b a a
a c c
d b d
P P ′
There is also a tie-breaking preference b  c  d  a. The
difference between the profiles P and P ′ is that 3 prefers d
over a in P but a over d in P ′. We prove that 1 can manipu-
late the election if the profile is P , and that 1 can manipulate
the election if the profile is P ′, but that the manipulation for
P gives a worse outcome for P ′, and that the manipulation
for P ′ gives a worse outcome for P . Therefore she is not
effectively able to manipulate the outcome of the election.
In Borda, the ranks for each candidate in each vote are
added, and the candidate with the highest sum wins, modulo
the tie-breaking preference. The preferred candidate gets 3
points, the 2nd choice 2 points, etc. First, the outcome when
all three agents give their truthful vote. We write xyzw when
there are x points for a, y for b, z for c, w for d.
profile count observation outcome
P 3555 b, c, d are tied b
P ′ 5553 a, b, c are tied b
Voter 1 can manipulate P or P ′ by downgrading b. But this
is tricky, because it comes at the price of making a or d, or
both, more preferred. This price is indeed too high:
In P , 1 can achieve a better outcome by ′1 defined as
1 : cabd. Let Q = P [1/′1], and Q′ = P [1/′1]. Although
1 prefers the winner in Q over the winner in P , the winner
in Q′ is less preferred by her than the winner in P ′:
profile count observation outcome
Q 4455 c, d are tied c
Q′ 6453 a
In P ′, 1 can achieve a better outcome by ′′1 defined as
1 : cdba. Let R = P [1/′′1 ], and R′ = P [1/′′1 ]. Now,
1 prefers the winner in R′ over the winner in P ′, but the
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winner in R is less preferred by her than the winner in P :
profile count observation outcome
R 2457 1’s worst dream d
R′ 4455 c, d are tied c
For the record, the winners for all different votes for voter
1 where c is most preferred.
1 : cbad 1 : cabd 1 : cdba 1 : cadb 1 : cdab 1 : cbda
b(3555) c(4455) d(2457) d(4356) d(3357) d(2556)
b(5553) a(6453) c(4455) a(6354) c(5355) b(4554)
In the language L we cannot say that the outcome of the
election in P is preferred by a voter to the outcome of the
election in P ′. For that, we need to add primitives P i P ′
to the language. These act as background knowledge. They
encode the voting function so that its results are available
in all states and in all profile models.
Definition 12 (Language L+) We expand the set of propo-
sitional variables with P i P ′ for any P, P ′ ∈ O(C)n, and
we add the following clause to the semantics:
Ps |= P i P ′ iff F (P ) i F (P ′)
The variables P i P ′ mean that voter i prefers the candi-
date chosen by the votes in P over the candidate chosen by
the votes in P ′. This is a(n) (inefficient) way to encode the
voting function. We observe that the semantics is indeed
independent from state s and profile model P . These are
model validities |= P i P ′.
All notions of manipulation in Definition 11 are definable
in the extended language L+.
Definition 13 Let Ps be a knowledge profile with profile P .
• Voter i has a successful manipulation:
P ∧ (P → i) ∧
∨
P ′
(P ′ i P ∧ (P ′ ↔i P ))
• Voter i has a successful manipulation ′i:
P ∧ (P → i) ∧ (P ′ → ′i) ∧ (P ′ ↔i P ) ∧ P ′ i P
• Voter i knows de dicto that she has a successful manipu-
lation:
P ∧ (P → i) ∧Ki
∨
P ′
((P ′ ↔i P )) ∧ P ′ i P )
• Voter i knows de re that she has a successful manipulation:
P ∧ (P → i) ∧∨′i [((P
′ ↔i P ) ∧ P ′ i P ∧ P ′ → ′i))∧
Ki(P
′′ → ((P ′ ↔i P ′′) ∧ P ′ i P ′′))
De re knowledge of weak manipulation is similarly defined.
Proposition 2 Knowledge of manipulation is definable in
L+.
Proof. As evidenced in Definition 13.
5. EQUILIBRIUM AND KNOWLEDGE
Determining equilibria under incomplete knowledge comes
down to decision taking under incomplete knowledge. There-
fore we have to choose a decision criterion. Expected utility
makes no sense here, because we didn’t start with proba-
bilities over profiles in the first place, nor with utilities. In
the absence of prior probabilities, the following three cri-
teria make sense. (i) The insufficient reason (or Laplace)
criterion considers all possible states in a given situation as
equiprobable. This criterion was used in [1] to determine
equilibria of certain (Bayesian) games of imperfect informa-
tion. (ii) The maximum regret criterion selects the decision
minimizing the maximum utility loss, taken over all possible
states, compared to the best decision, had the voter known
the true state. (iii) The pessimistic (or Wald, or maximin)
criterion compares decisions according to their worst possi-
ble consequences. The latter criterion, that we also call risk
averse, is one that fits well our probability-free and utility-
free model; this was also the criterion chosen in [9]. The
only assumption here is that the probability distribution is
positive in all states. We now fix this criterion for the rest
of the paper. (Pessimistic, optimistic, and yet other crite-
ria only assuming positive probability are applied to social
choice settings in the recent [21]. We think their interesting
results can be modelled as games using our setting.)
In the presence of knowledge, the definition of an equi-
librium extends naturally. The trick is that for each agent,
the combination of an agent i and an equivalence class [s]∼i
for that agent (for some state s in the knowledge profile)
defines a so-called virtual agent (we model these imperfect
information games as Bayesian games [14]). Thus, agent i
is multiplied in as many virtual agents as there are equiva-
lences classes for ∼i in the model.
In our setting we can almost think of these equivalence
classes as sets of indistinguishable profiles. Almost but not
quite: we recall that states with different properties in a
given equivalence class, or states in different equivalence
classes, may be assigned the same profile.
An equilibrium is then a combination of votes such that
none of the virtual agents has an interest to deviate. A in-
tuitively more appealing solution than virtual agents, also
applied in [1], is to stick to the agents we already have,
but change the set of votes into a larger set of conditional
votes — where the conditions are the equivalence classes for
the agents. This we will now follow in the definition below.
For risk-averse voters we can effectively determine if a con-
ditional profile is an equilibrium without taking probability
distributions into account, unlike in the more general setting
of Bayesian games that it originates with.
Definition 14 (Conditional equilibrium) Given is a knowl-
edge profile model P such that every voter knows her prefer-
ence (truthful vote). For each agent i, a conditional vote is
a function []i : S/∼i → O(C), i.e., a function that assigns
a vote to each equivalence class for that agent. A condi-
tional profile is a collection of n conditional votes, one for
each agent. A conditional voting game is then a (standard)
strategic game where voters declare conditional votes. A con-
ditional profile is an equilibrium iff no agent has a successful
manipulation in any of its equivalence classes.
The outcome of a conditional profile consisting of conditional
votes is a n-tuple of vectors (x1, . . . , xm) where voter i has
m equivalence classes. The definition of equilibrium for the
conditional voting game is derived from the Bayesian game
form. It is not the standard form of strategic games! Con-
sider a case for two equivalence classes for a voter 1 where
two outcome vectors for 1 are (a, d) and (d, a), and a i d.
We cannot say which of these two are preferred: therefore,
the outcomes for 1 are not ordered, and therefore, it does
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not define a standard strategic game. However, if we only
vary 1’s vote in the first argument (equivalence class) or in
the second argument, the outcomes are ordered. This is the
Bayesian game computation of equilibrium, where we deter-
mine manipulability for each virtual agent. Therefore, in
the definition we did not write ‘A conditional profile is an
equilibrium iff no agent has a successful manipulation’ but
‘(. . . ) iff no agent has a successful manipulation in any of
its equivalence classes.’
The requirement in Def. 14 that voters need to know their
preference (truthful vote), is because the value they asso-
ciate with that class is the worst outcome. This might oth-
erwise be undefined.
Example 3 We recall Example 1. There are two voters 1,
2, and four candidates a, b, c, d. Consider a plurality vote
with a tie-breaking rule b  a  c  d.
First consider the profile P defined as
1 2
a d
c c
b b
d a
If 1 votes for her preference a and 2 votes for his preference
d, then the tie prefers a, 2’s least preferred candidate. If
instead 2 votes c, a will still win. But if 2 votes b, b wins.
We observe that (a, b) and (b, b) are equilibria pairs of votes,
and that for 1 voting a is dominant.
This is also apparent from the voting matrix (wherein equi-
libria are boxed), and even more so when we express the pay-
offs for both voters by their ranking for the winner, as on the
right.
1\2 a b c d
a a b a a
b b b b b
c a b c d
d a b d d
1\2 a b c d
a 30 11 30 30
b 11 11 11 11
c 30 11 22 03
d 30 11 03 03
Example 4 We now add uncertainty to the setting of Ex-
ample 3. Consider another profile P ′, that is as P , but where
1’s vote is 1 : dcba. Now consider a knowledge profile as fol-
lows. It remains the case that the actual profile is P ; voter 2
is uncertain which of P and P ′ is the case; whereas voter 1
knows that. (It is tempting to add: voter 1 of course knows
that, as he knows his own vote; but our framework equally
applies to situations where he does not, e.g., because he has
not yet made up his mind.) And, as one should always add:
1 and 2 know that this is the uncertainty about the profile.
This knowledge profile PP consists of states t and u.
1 2
a d
c c
b b
d a
——2——
1 2
d d
c c
b b
a a
t, P u, P ′
What are the conditional equilibria of P? Votes (a, b) and
(b, b) still lead to elect b and are the equilibria in state t with
profile P . The only equilibrium vote for for state u with
profile P ′ is (d, d)—the preferences are identical for 1 and
2, and d is their top candidate.
We argue our way towards the equilibria of this conditional
voting game. There are two. Of course, alternatively to this
argument one can directly determine these are equilibria by
applying Definition 14 in a 16 × 4 matrix (below). Recall
that we assumed that voters are risk-averse.
First, consider voter 1. For each equivalence class of 1, we
have to determine her optimal vote. If the profile is P , 1’s
vote for a is dominant, so no matter what strategic consid-
erations 2 may have due to the additional uncertainty about
the profile, does not make a difference. Voter 1 votes a. If
the profile is P ′, d is dominant for 1.
Next, consider voter 2. Because 2 is risk-averse he will
vote b. Because if 2 votes d and the profile is P , a wins
because 1 votes a, as this is dominant for 1 (or b wins because
1 votes b); whereas if the profile is P ′ and 2 votes d, then d
wins because 1 votes d, which is dominant there. The worst
outcome of these two is a (or b). Whereas if 2 votes b, the
worst outcome is b. (The votes c and a can be eliminated
from consideration as well.)
The two equilibria that we can associate with this knowl-
edge profile are below. The conditional vote for 1 in the first
equilibrium actually is actually defined as: []1({t}) = 1
and []1({u}) = ′1; and the vote for 2 is conditional to one
equivalence class — in other words, it is unconditional. The
equivalent verbose formulation is more intelligable.
• (if 1 prefers a then a and if 1 prefers d then d, b),
• (if 1 prefers a then b and if 1 prefers d then d, b).
In particular, 2 does not know that d is his equilibrium vote
in P ′, because he considers it possible that the profile is P ,
where, if 2 votes d, 1 votes a (or 1 can improve her outcome
by voting a), in which case 2 is worse off than d.
We can represent the game by a 16× 4 matrix (Table 1).
A conditional vote ab for 1 means: in t she votes a and in u
she votes b. The outcome triples xyz represent: (worst and
only) outcome for 1 in equivalence class of t, (worst and
only) outcome for 1 in equivalence class of u; (worst) out-
come for 2 in equivalence class of {t, u}. The table contains
much symmetry. We omitted the table in terms of ranked
outcomes. A triple like aaa corresponds to ranked outcome
144: the equal winners a for voter 1 are ranked according
to different profiles, a is preferred in state t / in profile P ,
hence 1, but a is least preferred in state u / in profile P ′,
hence 4. In Table 1, the third of a triple xyz is necessarily
equal to the least preferred of x and y, but this is an artifact
of the example (namely, that the two equivalence classes for
1 together comprise the equivalence class for 2).
Example 5 We can add further uncertainty to Example 5.
1 2
a d
c c
b b
d a
——1——
1 2
a d
c c
b b
d a
——2——
1 2
d d
c c
b b
a a
s, P t, P u, P ′
Consider a third state that has the same profile P as the
actual state, but that has different epistemic properties: 2 is
not uncertain about the profile there, but 1 cannot distinguish
this from the other state for P wherein 2 is uncertain about
the profile. This is the profile model from Example 1.
Will 1 vote differently in s and t? In fact, she will not, nor
will 2, and the conditional equilibria votes remain the same;
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1\2 a b c d
aa aaa bbb aaa aaa
ab aba bbb aaa aaa
ac aaa bbb aca aca
ad aaa bbb aaa ada
ba baa bbb baa baa
bb bbb bbb bbb bbb
bc baa bbb bcb bcb
bd baa bbb bbb bdb
ca aaa bbb caa caa
cb aaa bbb cbb cbb
cc aaa bbb ccc ccc
cd aaa bbb ccc cdc
da aaa bbb caa daa
db aaa bbb cbb dbb
dc aaa bbb ccc dcc
dd aaa bbb ccc ddd
Table 1: Conditional equilibria
strictly, 2’s vote should depend on his equivalence class, but
as 2’s choice is the same either way, namely b, his vote is
more succinctly described as an unconditional: b.
We did not yet attempt to characterize conditional equi-
libria in the logic of the previous sections, as we did for
manipulation and knowledge of manipulation (Def. 9 and
13). This might be interesting for epistemic game theory [2,
22], but even so we only deal with the special case of voting
games.
6. DYNAMICS: REVEALINGPREFERENCE
We can extend the modal logical setting for voting and
knowledge of the previous sections with logical operations
that are dynamic in character. In the context of voting, two
obvious choices here are public announcement of a proposi-
tion (such as an agent revealing her true preference), and
declaring a vote. Such actions can be modelled as semantic
operations Ps → Ps|ϕ (for propositions ϕ, e.g., respectively,
ϕ = i for revealing her preference) and Ps → Pi:=s
(for voter i declaring vote i). In this section we deal with
public announcement, in the next section, with public as-
signment.
A well-known dynamic feature of epistemic logics is truth-
ful public announcement [23]. Given a knowledge profile Ps,
the requirement for execution of public announcement of ϕ
is that ϕ is true in Ps, and the way to execute it is to re-
strict the model P to all the states where ϕ is true. We can
then investigate the truth of propositions in that model re-
striction: we can evaluate formulas of form [ϕ]ψ, for ‘After
announcement of ϕ, ψ (is true)’, such as: ‘After 1 reveals
her preference (truthful vote) to 2, 2 knows that he has a
successful manipulation’. We need to add a clause to the
logical language for these announcements and define their
semantics. The model restriction to the ϕ-states is denoted
as Ps|ϕ.
Definition 15 (Public announcement) We add an in-
ductive clause [ϕ]ϕ to the logical language L (i.e., a dynamic
modal operator with an argument of type formula followed by
a postcondition also of type formula). Its semantics is:
Ps |= [ϕ]ψ iff Ps |= ϕ implies Ps|ϕ |= ψ,
where Ps|ϕ = (S′,∼′1, . . . ,∼′n, π′) such that S′ = {t ∈ S :
Pt |= ϕ}, ∼′i = ∼i ∩ (S′ × S′), and π′(a i b) = π(a i
b) ∩ S′.
Example 6 Consider again Examples 1 and 4, with plural-
ity voting. In state t (for profile P ), after voter 1 informs
voter 2 of her true preference (a public announcement), the
uncertainty in the model disappears and 1 and 2 commonly
know that the profile is P . The equilibrium vote remains
(b, b). So this seems not a big deal.
On the other hand, in state u voter 1 has an incentive to
make her preference known to 2: after that, 2’s equilibrium
vote changes from b to d, and the equilibrium profile is now
(d, d). And that is a big deal.
The transitions can be depicted as follows:
1 2
a d
c c
b b
d a
⇐
1 2
a d
c c
b b
d a
——2——
1 2
d d
c c
b b
a a
⇒
1 2
d d
c c
b b
a a
t, P t, P u, P ′ u, P ′
We can now formalize statements as
Pt |= ¬K2 a 1 c ∧ [a 1 c]K2 a 1 c.
There are two obvious ways to interpret such public an-
nouncements in voting theory: (i) when voters make an-
nouncements about their own preferences (and such that
these announcements are trusted by other voters), and, more
properly from the viewpoint of public announcement logic,
(ii) when external observers, such as a central authority, re-
veal preferences to voters. The last can be interpreted as
holding a voting poll. Successive voting polls reduce the un-
certainty for the individual voter of the preferences (truthful
vote) of other voters. And this may determine the strategic
vote.
Two obvious results are that:
Proposition 3 Knowledge of weakly successful manipula-
tion is not preserved after update.
Proof. We recall Definition 11. For the weak form of
manipulation there were two requirements: (a) the profile
of at least one state in a given equivalence class for voter
i needs to have a manipulation, and (b) the profiles of all
states in that equivalence class must have either equal or
better outcome. The state with a manipulation need not
be the actual state, therefore, after model restriction the
existential requirement (a) may no longer hold. This holds
for ‘de re’ as well as ‘de dicto’ knowledge.
Proposition 4 Knowledge of successful manipulation is pre-
served after update.
Proof. The profiles of all states have a manipulation, a
universal property that is preserved after update.
7. DYNAMICS OF DECLARING VOTES
A voter i declaring a vote i can be modelled in dynamic
epistemic terms as an assignment (a.k.a. ontic change, in
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contrast to an informative change like an announcement and
coalition deliberation). A succinct way to model this is to
expand the knowledge profiles with a duplicate set of propo-
sitional variables expressing voter preference, initially all set
to false. To distinguish the preference (truthful vote) from
the declared vote we keep writing i for the former whereas
we write i for the latter. So, the set of variables a i b en-
code the preferences of the voters, whereas variables a i b
encode their declared votes.
The action of declaring a vote i, defined by preferences
a i b, sets the value of the propositions encoding i in
the model to true: these are the assignments a i b := 
executed for all a i b ini. If we assume that the declared
vote is public, then this assignment can be executed in all
states of the knowledge profile. The dynamic epistemic logic
equivalent to achieve that is a public assignment [29, 27].
Definition 16 (Public assignment) We add an inductive
clause [a i b := ]ϕ to the logical language. For the se-
mantics, given a knowledge profile Ps, Ps |= [a i b := ]ϕ
iff (Paib)s |= ϕ, where Paib is as P except that π(a i
b) = D(P). By abbreviation we define i :=  as the se-
quential execution of all assignments a i b := T for all
terms a i b in i.
Assignments need not be to ‘true’ () but can be to any
formula. Such an assignment a i b := ψ has semantics
π(a i b) = {t ∈ D(P) | Pt |= ψ. Declaring one’s prefer-
ence, the truthful vote, can then be seen as the assignment
i := i.
Example 7 Consider a 1 b 1 c. The assignment declar-
ing this vote is the sequence of three assignments a 1 b :=
, b 1 c := , a 1 c := , abbreviated as i := .
Example 8 Another continuation of Example 4 is with declar-
ing votes. If in state t voter 2 declares his vote, i.e., fixes d as
the candidate of his choice, 1 votes a, because with the given
tie b  a  d  c, her preference a now gets elected. We
can simulate this assignment as the sequence of d2c := ,
d2b := , d2a :=  (or as the assignment of prefer-
ence to the declared vote: 2 := 2). For simplicity this is
depicted as making d bold.
1 2
a d
c c
b b
d a
——2——
1 2
d d
c c
b b
a a
⇒
1 2
a d
c c
b b
d a
——2——
1 2
d d
c c
b b
a a
t, P u, P ′ t, P ′ u, P ′
We have no results yet for the interaction of declaring
votes and revealing voter preference, but Stackelberg games
are the obvious games of interest here.
Axiomatization and completeness. All four logics pro-
posed in this work have sound and complete axiomatizations
with respect to the class of profile models. However, this is
not remarkable. We have therefore omitted these axiomati-
zations, for that see the cited references.
8. CHAIR AND COALITIONS
We have some modelling results concerning matters rel-
evant for social choice theory that we have chosen not to
incorporate in the main story, as not to lose focus there:
how to model the central authority, and group notions of
preference and knowledge.
8.1 Central authority
Apart from the n voters, it seems convenient to distin-
guish yet another agent: a designated agent named 0, the
central authority, or chair. We recall that the tie-breaking
preference tie is a linear order on candidates. Apart from
applying the tie, the central authority may perform other
kinds of actions such as fixing the agenda. This also opens
the door to the logical modelling of well-studied problems
in computational social choice, such as control by the chair,
or determining possible winners. The main reason not to
model the chair it that her role is uniform throughout the
model (throughout any knowledge profile model). We as-
sume that there is no uncertainty on what the voting rule
(and the tie-breaking preference) is. So in that sense it is
exogenous.
The universal relation S×S on a knowledge profile model
can be seen as the indistinguishability relation of the agent
0, the central authority. On a connected model (i.e., when
there is always a path between any two states in the model)
this is the same as common knowledge of the voters. The
computational tasks of the central authority, be it deter-
mining the possible winners or finding strategic actions such
as agenda fixing or any other form of control, can only be
harder on knowledge profiles as it has to take uncertainty
into account. By identifying the central authority with an
agent with universal ignorance we can be precise about how
much harder.
A partial profile in the social choice literature corresponds
in a profile model to the set of profiles completing it, with
identity access for all voters, and indistinguishable for the
central authority, as in the following example. (The set of
partial profiles then seems to consist of such disconnected
parts.)
Example 9 The following depicts the partial profile (b 1
a 1 c, a 2 {b, c}). Voters 1 and 2 have identity access on
the profile model. The central authority is agent 0.
1 2
b a
a b
c c
——0——
1 2
b a
a c
c b
8.2 Coalitional manipulation
Group notions play an important role in social choice the-
ory. We consider coalitions G ⊆ N . As straightforward
generalizations of (individual) preference i, (individual)
manipulation, (weak) equilibrium, and (weak) equilibrium
of a conditional voting game, we can also define: coalitional
preference G, and successful manipulation by a coalition G.
A profile P ′ is a strong equilibrium profile iff no coalition has
a successful manipulation.
Group notions also play an important role in epistemic
logic. Two notions useful in our setting are common knowl-
edge and distributed knowledge. Given a knowledge profile,
a proposition is commonly known if it is true in all states
reachable (from the actual state of the knowledge profile)
by arbitrarily long finite paths in the model (reflexive tran-
sitive closure of access for all voters in the coalition). With
the interpretation of common knowledge of coalition G we
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can thus associate an equivalence relation ∼G (defined as
(
⋃
i∈G ∼i)∗). A proposition is distributedly known in a
knowledge profile, if it is true in the intersection of accessi-
bility relations in the actual state (the relation
⋂
i∈G ∼i).
If there is no uncertainty about the profile, the voters have
common knowledge about the profile. This assumption is al-
most always made in social choice theory. It is important
to observe that in the presence of uncertainty this strong
form of common knowledge disappears, but that still some
form of common knowledge remains: all agents have com-
mon knowledge of the structure of the profile model. This
means that they have common knowledge of the set of states,
the accessibility relations of the knowledge model, and what
profiles these states stand for. The only thing they do (or
rather, may) not know is the designated point of the profile
model: what the preferences (truthful votes) are.
Coalitions play a big role in voting, partly because in re-
alistic settings the power of individual voters is very limited.
Now by analogy, just as the vote of an individual agent de-
pends on her knowledge, the vote of a coalition would seem
to depend on the common knowledge of that coalition. But
that seems wrong. In voting theory, the power of a coalition
means the power of a set of agents that can decide on a joint
action as a result of communication between them. Com-
munication makes the uncertainty about each others’ pro-
files disappear. In terms of knowledge profiles, this means
that we are talking about another model, namely the model
where for all agents i ∈ G, ∼i is refined to ⋂i∈G ∼i. What
determines the voting power of a coalition seems rather its
distributed knowledge.
We are still exploring the implications of these observa-
tion, and should note that also other choices can be made
to model the power of a coalition in voting.
Knowledge of manipulation and equilibria of conditional
voting games can also be defined for coalitions but have been
left out of this presentation.
9. CONCLUSION, FURTHER RESEARCH
We presented a formal logical semantics for the interac-
tion of voting and knowledge. The semantic primitive is the
knowledge profile: a profile including uncertainty of voters
about what the actual profile is. This reveals different no-
tions for knowledge of manipulation, such as de re knowledge
of manipulation and de dicto knowledge of manipulation,
and novel notions for equilibria, such as conditional equi-
librium for risk-averse voters. Dynamic operations on such
knowledge profiles can also be modelled, and their effects
on manipulation, where we distinguished public announce-
ments, such as revealing true preferences, from public as-
signments, i.e., declaring votes.
As far as the formalization is concerned, our setting is
very similar to that of the recent literature on robust mech-
anism design [7], which generalizes classical mechanism de-
sign by weakening the common knowledge assumptions of
the environment among the players and the planner. In [7]
uncertainty is modelled with information partitions. The
main technical difference is that in our setting, as in classi-
cal social choice theory, preferences are ordinal, whereas in
(robust) mechanism design preferences are numerical pay-
offs, which allows for payments (which we don’t). This con-
nection with mechanism design, however, is certainly worth
exploring further. (We are very grateful to an anonymous
reviewer for pointing this connection to us.)
The logical setting defined in the paper allows us to repre-
sent various classes of situations already studied specifically
in (computational) social choice, thus offering a general rep-
resentation framework in which, of course, new classes of
problems will be representable as well, thus providing an
homogeneous, unified representation framework. In some of
the classes of problems we need one more agent, the chair.
The chair may have preferences, but does not vote. In some
classes of problems the dynamics plays a crucial role in defin-
ing these problems, both as announcements (revealing pref-
erence) and assignments (declaring votes). Here are a few
such problems:
1. possible and necessary winners [17]: there is one more
agent (the chair), who has an incomplete knowledge
of each of the votes; the voters’ knowledge is does not
matter. x is a possible winner if the chair does not
know that x is not a (co)winner, and a necessary win-
ner if the chair knows that x is a (co)winner
2. Stackelberg voting games [30]: voters express their votes
in sequence, in a commonly known order. Their pref-
erences are common knowledge. The votes are an-
nounced publicly and each voter thus know the vote
of the voters which speak before him.
3. sequential voting games with abstention [10]: voters ex-
press their votes in sequence, preferences are common
knowledge; the voting rule is plurality; voters have the
choice to vote or to abstain; voting is costly.
4. control by adding or removing voters or candidates [6]:
the chair has a perfect knowledge of the voters’ pref-
erences; voters have no knowledge (and thus are sup-
posed to vote truthfully); the chair may add or remove
some candidates as well as register or unregister voters.
5. sequential voting on multi-issue domains [18]: the set
of alternatives is a combinatorial domains, therefore
the valuations are preference relations over tuples of
values; voters vote in sequence, issue by issue, and the
value for the (binary) issue is chosen by majority, and
then communicated to the voters.
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